Organizational Structures for Emergency Response
Organizational structures for emergency response must
be based on two basic principles. First, the organizational structure used to
respond to everyday emergencies will form the basis of an expanded structure to
deal with disasters. Second, the local response structure must be flexible
enough to readily expand as additional external resources are added to match
the increasing agent generated and response generated demands of the disaster.
The prevailing organizational structures for emergency response are ICS and
IMS. These two organizational structures differ, but relatively slightly.
Incident Command System/Incident Management System
For many years, the federal government provided state
and local governments with criteria for evaluating their EOPs (US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980; National
Response Team, 1987, 1988; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1988, 1990,
1996b). However, it avoided requiring—or even recommending—a specific structure
for emergency response organizations to meet those criteria. In part, that
reluctance seems to have been based on the principle that a federal system
should allow state and local governments to meet the federal planning criteria
in any way that they deemed appropriate. Moreover, as a practical matter, state
governments across the country differ from each other in their normal
organizational structures and resources, as do local governments. Consequently,
the imposition of a single structure for emergency response organizations might
have seemed doomed to failure. The consequence of the federal government’s
performance oriented (rather than prescriptive) approach was a proliferation of
organizational structures, positional titles, resource names, and operational
procedures that sometimes impeded interjurisdictional cooperation—even among
identical emergency response agencies (e.g., fire departments) from neighboring
jurisdictions.
Following a major series of wildfires in Southern California in 1970, fire departments joined to
address the lack of a common organizational structure, inadequate emergency
assessments, poorly coordinated planning, uncoordinated resource allocation,
and inadequate interagency communications at the incident scene. This led to
the development of the ICS, which can be summarized in terms of seven basic
principles (cf. Irwin, 1989, see also National Wildfire Coordinating Group,
1994; National Response Team, no date). First, all jurisdictions use a common
organizational structure that encompasses standardized names and functions for
subunits (standardization). This
includes standardized names and duties for individual positions to make
personnel from different jurisdictions interchangeable. Second, there is a
division of labor, so each unit is assigned a specific function to perform (functional specificity). Third, subunits
are established to limit the number of personnel directly supervised by each
unit manager (manageable span of control).
This is usually five subordinates, but the number can range from three to
seven. Fourth, personnel from a given professional discipline (e.g., police or
fire) are assigned to the same unit in the emergency response organization to
facilitate teamwork and also to simplify recordkeeping (unit integrity). Fifth, most incidents are managed by a single
Incident Commander (IC), but a Unified Command team manages the emergency
response when multiple agencies have statutory authority and responsibility for
a specific type of incident (unified
command). Sixth, senior incident managers develop action plans that include
specific, measurable objectives and evaluate their effectiveness by monitoring
the achievement of these objectives (management
by objectives). Seventh, the IC or Unified Command team direct the
allocation of all resources—including personnel, facilities, vehicles, and
equipment—to emergency response tasks (comprehensive
resource management).
Over the next
decade, ICS received increasing support as a collection of organizing rules
designed to serve the needs of fire and police departments (Kramer & Bahme,
1992). Unfortunately, the way in which ICS was implemented tended to be region
specific and, in some cases, idiosyncratic to a single jurisdiction. By the
1980s, the fire services in particular became concerned that responding
departments needed a common ICS to increase the effectiveness of response to
larger incidents. With funding from FEMA, FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of
Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies) developed a version of
ICS that was ultimately adopted and promoted by the FEMA (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1987). FIRESCOPE ICS is a planning based emergency response
system that combines planning functions with the functions of an EOC. Planning
and coordination is achieved by a multiagency coordination system (MAC) that is
operated by a team of agency directors and divided into two functional tasks.
The first is a computer-based Fire Information Management System that stores
fire relevant data. The second is an operations coordination system that
implements policy devised by the MAC. The EOC component of FIRESCOPE comprises
sections that deal with issues of field operations, logistics, planning and
finance.
Although this version of ICS was tailored specifically
to large scale incidents and to the jurisdictional structure of Southern California fire services, it was a major
improvement over previous systems (Coleman & Granito, 1988; Lesak, 1989).
The basic system was very popular and promising, but was used for several years
only on major multijurisdictional emergencies, rather than for minor fire
department incidents. With support from the National Fire Protection
Association, Brunacini (1985, 2002) adapted and enhanced the FIRESCOPE system
so it could be used as readily in small events as large ones. Brunacini changed
the command function to include specialized advisors, expanded the operations
function to include routine departmental response demands (hazardous materials
response, technical rescue, evacuation, etc.), and included explicit
connections to a municipal EOC and police incident commanders. The advantage of
this revised structure, called the Incident Management System (IMS), was that
daily use on all incidents—minor and major—would enhance the effectiveness of the
system when it needed to be used in the rarely experienced major incidents. IMS
is now widely used in the American, Canadian, British, and Australian fire
services. For more than a decade, the Oklahoma State University Fire Services
Program and the National Fire Protection Association have provided IMS
instruction in the US
and internationally. DHS is in the process of requiring all jurisdictions to
adopt the NIMS version of ICS as a condition for reimbursement of disaster
expenses. Despite this requirement, this chapter will discuss IMS as it has
been implemented by Phoenix Fire because the differences from NIMS/IMS are not
substantial. In addition, Chapter 10 will show that both of these systems lack
adequate structures for managing large scale population protection tasks
effectively.
A principal consequence of IMS is to make all
resources of the jurisdiction available for every incident, whether it is a
routine emergency or a communitywide disaster. The resources are provided
automatically, as the IC escalates the response to meet the emerging incident
demands. The IMS itself is a field structure that can manage resources at
multiple impact scenes from an Incident Command Post. In such cases, the IMS
might not necessarily be supported by activation of an EOC, especially in minor
incidents. In disasters that are diffuse and present no real geographic
location for scene operations, the jurisdictional EOC can assume the role of
the onscene Incident Command Post in using IMS to manage the emergency response.
This would be particularly likely in response to a terrorist attack involving a
biological agent where impacts might not be detected until long after the
attack, at which point the source might be unclear and remain the subject of
investigation.
The advantage of using the local IMS (supplemented by
a jurisdictional EOC) as the basis for emergency and disaster response lies in
its enhancement of the ability to quickly and effectively initiate emergency
operations. Thus, every incident is initially addressed by trained and equipped
emergency responders guided by an IC. These personnel are always on duty,
responding to all calls. Especially in CBR terrorist threats, this approach
reduces the chance that untrained, unprotected responders will enter an incident
scene and become casualties themselves. Whether the incident is known to be a
disaster (such as a major flood, hurricane, or chemical plant incident) or
initially appears to be a routine incident that becomes a disaster (e.g., an
emergency call for “people down” is the first indication that terrorists have
launched a chemical attack), IMS is an organizational structure for emergency
response that is already established and can be expanded to fit situational
demands.
Basic IMS Principles
The IMS as a system is built around responsibilities
vested in standardized roles rather than the idiosyncratic abilities of
individuals. The fundamental principle of IMS is that there must always be one
(and only one) IC at every incident scene. In principle, any emergency responder
may assume the role of IC. In practice, however, the IC is usually the first
arriving company officer (usually of an engine company or ladder company) or
Battalion Chief (supervisor). Thus, it is the duty of the most senior officer
who is first to arrive at the incident scene to assume command. Once
established, command may be transferred to other more senior officers as they
arrive. Figure 9-1 shows a fully implemented IMS structure that would be
appropriate for a major disaster, but IMS size and composition expand as the IC
seeks to meet incident demands. Thus, the structure begins with the assumption
of command and the designation of specialized functional units to address the
hazard at the scene. This includes responding to agent generated demands that
involve addressing the threat itself (e.g., a fire; structural damage; victim
rescue, treatment, and transportation). It also includes dealing with response
generated demands that involve supporting the emergency responders (e.g.,
logistics of acquiring needed equipment and supplies; rescue for endangered
responders) and coordinating with other agencies (e.g., communicating
information about the incident to the EOC and the public).
IMS uses the terms sections,
branches, and sectors to describe different sized functional groupings of
personnel, equipment, and apparatus. In Figure 9-1, Command is shown with five sections directly attached to it. The
five sections—Planning, Operations, Administration, Safety,
and Logistics—are staffed as
appropriate to the incident size and conditions. Section chiefs in the Incident
Command Post work with the Command staff to formulate an overall emergency
response strategy. The section chiefs then direct and monitor tactical
operations, whereas branch and sector officers implement tactical operations.
In a fully implemented IMS, branches
are established under sections and are functional tactical areas relevant to
each section. For example, Figure 9-1 shows five branches under the operations
section—transport, rescue, hazardous materials, fire, and medical.
The naming of branches follows the specific activity
they perform; the number of branches depends upon the intensity of the demand
for each of the functions needed in the incident response. Thus, an IMS for an
urban earthquake would include a heavy rescue branch. Sectors are defined
beneath branches and execute specific tasks. Typically, sectors contain fire
companies or special teams. Branches and sectors are activated in response to
(or, better still, in anticipation of) incident demands. Hence, in small
hazardous materials incidents where few victims are present, the medical branch
would be only a single unit and is called a medical sector. In events where
there is no fire, the fire branch would not be activated. Although basic
principles of IMS are easy to grasp, more advanced concepts provide a complex
method of allocating responsibility for response strategy, tactics, and tasks
(Brunacini, 2002; Carlson, 1983).
As indicated earlier, there are some differences
between IMS and ICS structures. Under ICS, there is neither a Senior Adviser
nor a Support Officer. Instead, there is a Scientific Officer in the Command
Section and the Safety function is staffed by a single officer in the Command
Section rather than by a separate section. Moreover, ICS has only a single
Liaison Officer rather than separate police and EOC liaisons. Finally, ICS
defines Finance and Administration as two separate sections rather than
combining them as in IMS.
IMS Implementation
In larger incidents, the IC may be supported by a
Support Officer and Senior Advisor. Senior officers typically fill these two
additional roles within the IMS Command section as they arrive at the scene. After
assuming command, the IC establishes a command post and, throughout the
incident, performs seven activities.
- Conduct initial situation evaluation and continual reassessments
- Initiate, maintain, and control communications
- Identify the incident management strategy, develop an action plan, and assign resources
- Call for supplemental resources, including EOC activation
- Develop an organizational command structure
- Continually review, evaluate, and revise incident action plan
- Provide for continuing, transferring, and terminating command
Through these duties, the IC develops and maintains
the strategy and resources that will be needed to terminate the incident. The
Senior Advisor and Support Officer perform duties assigned by the IC—including
reviewing, evaluating, and recommending changes to the incident action plan. In
particular, the Senior Advisor
focuses on the overall incident management or “big picture” issues. This
officer monitors the overall incident, evaluating possible responses to current
and future incident demands in order to determine the need for activating
additional branches or sections. The Senior Advisor also evaluates the need for
liaison with other jurisdictional departments, outside agencies, public
officials, property owners, tenants, and other parties impacted by the
incident. In addition, the Support
Officer provides direction related to tactical priorities, critical
factors, and safety. Thus, this officer assists with creation of tactical
worksheets (written plans) for control and accountability and evaluates the
viability of the response organization and span of control. The Support Officer
also evaluates the need for additional resources at the scene and assigns
logistics responsibilities.
When there is a major emergency or a community-wide
disaster, most jurisdictions provide for the Command staff to be supported by
an onscene Public Information Officer
(PIO) and a Police Liaison to the law
enforcement command posts In addition, there is an EOC Liaison who is responsible for coordination between the
incident scene and the EOC. The goal of an Articulated
Command is to spread the functions to specialists where possible, permit
effective communication with responders on scene and emergency authorities off
scene, and allow the IC to focus on the incident demands.
As soon as it is practical, Command establishes a Public Information Sector to deal with
the mass media and provide the information the media will need to accurately
report the status of the incident and the response to it. The staff PIO directs
the sector, establishes a media area that does not impede operations (as
necessary), and gathers information about the incident. In a major incident,
the onscene PIO coordinates with the EOC PIO and PIOs of other responding
agencies to insure consistent, accurate information dissemination and to avoid
release of potentially sensitive information.
In complex incidents, particularly suspected or
identified terrorist attacks, Command assigns a Police Liaison Sector. A police supervisor’s presence may be
requested in the Fire Command Post or communications may be directly
established with the Police Command Post. The Police Liaison Sector deals with
all activities requiring coordination between the two departments, including
(but not limited to) traffic control, crowd control, incident scene security,
evacuations, crime scene management, and persons interfering with Fire
Department operations.
Within the IMS structure, Command delegates
responsibility for implementing its emergency response strategy to the five
section chiefs. The Planning Section
is charged primarily with technical liaison, forecasting incident demands, and
other planning functions. The Planning Section serves as the Incident
Commander’s “clearinghouse” for information. In CBR incidents, this function is
particularly critical because specialized information from a variety of
specialists (e.g., toxicologists and physicians) will flow to the scene, and
the Planning Section relays information from these sources to Command.
The Operations
Section deals directly with all hazard source control activities at the
incident site. In addition, this section is responsible for the safety and
welfare of personnel working within the section. A critical administrative duty
of the Operations Section is to establish branches that accomplish specific
tasks to meet incident demands. The Operations Section creates and oversees as
many branches as needed depending on the demands of the specific incident.
Branches typically include primary operational functions: transport, rescue,
hazmat, fire, and medical. Transport Branch is responsible for transporting
injured persons from the incident scene to hospitals for definitive care.
Rescue Branch is charged with search and rescue and extrication of firefighters
who become lost, trapped, or endangered. This branch may oversee a potentially
large number of units serving as Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC units)
commensurate with the size of the incident. RIC units stage, at full ready,
with the exclusive responsibility of first responder rescue. In addition, an
Evacuation Branch or Sector can be created to deal with endangered citizens.
The Hazardous Materials Branch typically houses four
sectors representing the four principal functions of research, monitoring, decontamination,
and site entry. In a hazmat incident, the Hazardous Materials Branch addresses
critical response priorities; identifies the hazard agent; designates hot,
warm, and cold zones; and coordinates with law enforcement resources for site
access control and special services (e.g. Bomb Squad or Special Weapons and
Tactics). To assist in agent identification, this branch is supported by the
Planning Section, onscene toxicology specialists (if appropriate), and other
specialized personnel operating in the EOC. An Entry Team Sector is responsible
for hot zone entry and is supported by a Backup Team Sector. The latter is
present for relief or rescue of the entry team. Although emergency
decontamination of victims can begin with the first units on scene, the
Hazardous Materials Branch assembles specialized decontamination lines and
equipment and performs technical decontamination.
Fire Branch is charged with the management and
suppression of fires and, as appropriate, operates sectors (a tactical or task
level function). Fire Branch is charged with the
suppression of fire in the incident. When fire occurs in context of other
hazard agents such as explosives or hazardous materials, Fire Branch confers
with the Incident Commander to identify priorities. In some cases, Fire Branch
will operate in a defensive posture until other hazards have been addressed and
then shift to offensive operations to extinguish fire. In the operational
phase, Fire Branch operates a safety sector that includes one company in reserve
for rapid rescue of trapped firefighters. Building related (e.g., inside,
lobby, outside) sectors are used in high rise incidents to control access and
conduct inside firefighting. Directional sectors (e.g., north, south, roof) are
established for both defensive and offensive attacks. After the fire has been
declared to be controlled and flames are knocked down, the Overhaul Sector is
established to search for and extinguish any remaining active fire. Depending
upon the materials burning, the Overhaul Sector will remain at the site for
long periods to extinguish spontaneous combustions.
The Medical Branch coordinates the activity of sectors
and/or units to address extrication, triage, and treatment of patients. The
Extrication Sector is responsible for locating, extricating, and removing
patients to treatment areas. Triage Sector performs the initial assessment of
patient conditions and treatment needs. In hamat incidents, this function may
be performed before, simultaneously with, or after decontamination. The
toxicity of the agent determines victim assessment and, in the case of nerve
agents, the timing of antidote administration. Triage and initial treatment may
also be performed within the Extrication Sector, depending upon the stability
of the area where patients are located. Similarly, contingent upon the agent,
antidote administration may be appropriate at the earliest moment. In such
cases treatment and extrication personnel with appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE) would begin administration prior to or during mass
decontamination. When time is not critical to survival, antidote administration
may take place at treatment areas, which can also serve as patient collection
areas. Triage tags are used to categorize patient injuries and record treatments
administered in the field. The triage tag number also becomes the tracking
mechanism for patients.
Particularly in
a hazmat incident, Behavioral Health will operate as a sector within the
Medical Branch. These personnel and units may be assigned in a variety of
activities at the scene. The onscene Behavioral Health Coordinator works
through the Medical Branch Officer while maintaining liaison with the Planning
Section and the EOC (if the latter has been activated). Behavioral Health
units, with appropriate PPE, may oversee and assist patients awaiting
decontamination, during decontamination, in treatment, and during
transportation.
The Transportation Branch can expand as incident
demands escalate, typically to four sectors. Transport north and south
represent different directional movement points for ground transportation to
local hospitals or mass care facilities (usually established through the Red
Cross contact in the EOC). This movement may involve different vehicles as
appropriate to patient needs, including buses for uncontaminated or
decontaminated “walking wounded”, as well as ambulances or other vehicles
obtained through the National Guard, public transit, or other organizations.
The jurisdictional fire department might operate its own ambulance system, and
formal agreements (as well as mutual and automatic aid agreements) should be
established for transport vehicles from local EMS
providers and ambulance services. The Air Sector moves patients by rotary wing
aircraft if this is safe, given the hazard agent involved and the requirements
of the patients’ conditions. Finally, the NDMS Sector prepares patients in
accordance with the local NDMS plan and moves them to the designated collection
point for transport to other locations.
The Safety Section
is staffed by a Safety Officer who is responsible for mobilizing this unit and
maintaining safe operations at the incident scene. This officer’s primary task
is to develop and implement plans for rescue, incident scene safety practice,
and environmental remediation after emergency response operations have been
terminated. In large incidents, the Safety Officer is supported by additional
personnel who monitor reports from all incident scenes and report progress to
the Command Section. If safety observers discover a pattern of unsafe
practices, the Safety Officer is authorized to stop operations at an incident
scene.
The Administration
Section focuses on procurement, cost recovery, liability, and risk
management. These activities involve contracting with vendors to deliver
services that cannot be provided by the responding agencies and recording the
time of use for rental equipment. They also include establishing resource
sharing agreements among responding agencies as well as documenting casualties
and property damage to settle later claims.
The Logistics
Section is the support mechanism for the emergency response organization.
This section oversees a variety of functions and establishes sectors (which
operate at a tactical and task level) to execute its functions. Figure 9-1
shows four principal sectors under Logistics: Staging, Accountability,
Rehabilitation, and Resources. Staging oversees the initial arrivals of
unassigned companies (units). Accountability tracks the units and individual
crews responding to an incident to insure their safety. The Rehabilitation
Sector is responsible for the monitoring and care of deployed personnel,
addressing both physical and psychological ability to function effectively.
This sector uses specialized equipment and also provides food, fluids, and
debriefing for personnel. Finally, the Resource Sector oversees all equipment
and apparatus, provides any needed communications equipment, and handles
repairs and resupply. In a hazmat incident, this sector will be responsible for
supervising the movement of antidotes, other pharmaceuticals and medical
supplies, and equipment from local jurisdictional caches to the scene.
In summary, the IMS is a flexible structure for
organizing emergency response. Its value lies in the close linkage between
emergency plans and emergency response operations. To adequately plan for a
threat, it is imperative that the emergency response organization adapt to the
specific demands of each incident. The IMS both reflects and directs the
capabilities of the organizations that respond to the incident, so planning
processes that account for the local IMS have greater flexibility and a greater
likelihood of being successfully implemented in the field. The principal
advantage of IMS over the earlier ICS is that it provides for a better
accounting of the activities that must be performed away from the incident
scene. For example, IMS explicitly addresses activities such as warning,
evacuation, and mass care of victims that are not addressed within ICS. Unfortunately,
these activities must all be addressed by the Operations Section. For example,
an Evacuation Branch (staffed by either police or fire personnel, or both)
would be established to coordinate the movement of people from risk areas
adjacent to the scene and coordinate information releases to the public through
the onscene PIO. However, this arrangement requires the Operations Chief at an
incident scene to be responsible for branches or sectors that s/he cannot
supervise directly (because they are in other locations). Moreover, assignment
of these activities to the Operations Chief has the potential for violating the
principle of manageable span of control if s/he must supervise warning,
evacuation, and mass care branches in addition to transport, rescue, hazmat,
fire, and medical branches. Unfortunately, there has been no empirical research
on the effectiveness of IMS or ICS as an organizing mechanism for incident
command. In part, this situation exists because there is no formally structured
alternative command system to which it might be compared. There have been
attempts to adapt the IMS more directly to EOCs, but these efforts have been
descriptive rather than data based (Perry, 1995). Ultimately, the use of IMS
rests upon the intuitive strength of the assumption that implementing the seven
basic principles will yield more effective incident management.
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