Emergency Preparedness by Households and Businesses, and Government Agencies
Research on
household emergency preparedness has been conducted on a variety of hazard
agents (especially earthquakes and hurricanes) and has yielded consistent
findings across studies that have been summarized recently in the Protective
Action Decision Model discussed in Chapter 4. Specifically, there is evidence
that people have become increasingly aware of hazard mitigation and emergency
preparedness actions they can take to protect themselves from environmental
hazards (Lindell & Perry, 2000), but awareness of hazard adjustments does
not imply accuracy of risk area residents’ beliefs about them. For example,
Kunreuther, et al. (1978) found most non-policyholders who were aware
earthquake insurance coverage was available could not provide an accurate
estimate of its cost. A quarter of them were unable to give any estimate of the premium and most of
the rest overestimated premium rates (see also Palm, Hodgson, Blanchard &
Lyons, 1990).
Information derived from others is important because
disasters occur so infrequently that it is difficult to learn by trial and
error from personal experience. Researchers have examined two sources of social
influence—peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers) and the mass
media—and found evidence that both types are associated with seismic
adjustment. In particular, Mileti and O'Brien (1992) found adoption of seismic
adjustments immediately after the Loma Prieta earthquake was significantly
related to information quality (specificity, consistency, and source certainty)
and information reinforcement (number of warnings). Similarly, Mileti and
Fitzpatrick (1992) found significant effects for frequency of information receipt,
message specificity, and source consistency in their study of the Parkfield
prediction. More recently, Mileti and Darlington’s (1995, 1997) study of the
effects of a hazard awareness campaign in the San Francisco Bay area found that
respondents had engaged in a large number of seismic adjustments. Many of these
were adopted before the campaign, but even more were undertaken in the
following year. For example, emergency equipment storage rose from 50% to 81%,
food and water stockpiling increased from 44% to 75%, and earthquake insurance
purchases went from 27% to 40%. Mileti and Darlington
(1997) reported adoption of these and other adjustments was positively
correlated with the number of information channels and the presence of response
guidance.
Emergency
preparedness by businesses and government agencies suffers from many of the
same limitations as was observed among households. Environmental hazards have
low salience until an imminent threat arises, so emergency preparedness (and
hazard mitigation) must compete with routine demands for space on the
organizational agenda. This tendency is especially pronounced in organizations
with limited financial assets. Generalizing from research in the broader
literature on implementation indicates emergency preparedness programs are
difficult to implement because emergency management tends to be viewed as an
intractable problem; disaster reduction policies lack clear and measurable
performance objectives; jurisdictions have insufficient resources; public and
official support is minimal; and higher levels of government fail to provide
sufficient emergency management guidance to local jurisdictions (Waugh, 1988).
A basic problem is
that only a very few organizations are specifically evaluated on their
preparedness to continue operations after disaster strikes—known as continuity of government (COG) and continuity of operations (COO). COG
deals with the measures that assure government survives during and after a
disaster—the survival of the basic elements of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. COO addresses the measures ensuring
organizations can deliver essential services during and following a disaster.
In the case of government, this includes services such as tax assessment,
official records, and human services. Few organizations prepare for the need to
continue operations following disasters when they are called upon to meet
“normal” demands (Anthony, l994; Cooke, l995; Wolensky & Wolensky, l990).
As with households, disaster is only a vague threat that “ought to be addressed
someday” when more resources are available.
Federal agencies and
the federal government are required by statute, Presidential Decision Directive
67, and Executive Order 12656 to establish both continuity of government and
continuity of operations plans. Federal Preparedness Circulars 65, 66 and 67
(www.app1.fema.gov/library/ libfpc_a.htm) lay out specific guidance for
executives and emergency planners regarding plan development and content,
training and exercise requirements and the acquisition of alternate facilities
for continuity of operations. The US General Services Administration
(2002) maintains a COO plan template (www.gsa.gov) for use by federal planners.
COG and COO plans both
have nine major elements:
·
Concepts
of operations are guided by the jurisdiction emergency plan.
·
Essential
functions are identified and prioritized.
·
Unambiguous
lines of succession for executives are specified.
·
Authority
delegations and emergency decision-makers are predetermined.
·
EOCs
and alternate work facilities are identified.
·
Interoperable
communications are established.
·
Security
is enhanced for personnel, facilities, and critical resources.
·
Vital
records and databases are protected.
·
Schedules
of training and exercises are maintained.
Comparatively little research attention
has been devoted to COO preparedness among agencies lacking emergency response
functions (Lindell & Meier, l994). Virtually all of the existing research
on such agencies has been conducted on municipal and county organizations.
Three factors have been consistently identified as correlates of COO
preparedness, the first of which is organizational size (Quarantelli, 1981a;
Quarantelli, 1984). The explanation for this correlation is larger
organizations have more resources and are also likely to have a greater
perceived need for strategic planning, (Gillespie & Streeter, 1987;
Banerjee & Gillespie, l994; Lindell, et al., l996a). Second, the level of
perceived risk among organizational and department managers is positively
correlated with emergency preparedness (Mileti, l983, Mileti & Sorensen,
l987; Drabek, l990). Finally, the extent to which managers report seeking
information about environmental hazards is positively correlated with
organizational preparedness (Lindell, et al., l996a; Barlow, l993; Stallings,
l978). Perry and Lindell (l997c) assembled these factors into a model
predicting earthquake preparedness by municipal and county departments. The
three variables ultimately explained about two thirds of the variance in
earthquake preparedness, with risk perception and self reported
information-seeking behavior being the most important of the variables.
FEMA (no date, c) has developed an Emergency Management Guide for Business
& Industry that outlines a COO planning process, identifies critical
corporate emergency management functions, provides information about a variety
of hazards, and lists sources to contact for further information. However, few
research studies have examined the degree to which businesses have implemented
the recommended activities and most of that research focused on limited samples
of organizations. For example, Drabek (1991c, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c) studied
tourist oriented firms, whereas Whitney, Dickerson, and Lindell (2001) studied
hospitals, and Quarantelli, et al. (1979), Gabor (1981), and Lindell and Perry
(1998) examined hazardous materials handlers. It is only more recently that
researchers have conducted research on large, representative samples of
business organizations (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Mileti, et al., 1993;
Nigg, 1995; Webb, Tierney & Dahlhamer, 2000, 2002).
The available research shows businesses
display limited levels of COO preparedness. Drabek (1994a) found only 31% of
the businesses in his survey of 185 tourist oriented firms had adequate levels
of evacuation preparedness. Fewer than half of the businesses Mileti, et al.
(1993) interviewed in the San Francisco Bay Area had developed emergency plans,
trained employees, and conducted drills—despite this area’s experience in the
Loma Prieta earthquake only a few years earlier. A study conducted in Memphis and Des Moines
found low levels of business emergency preparedness—businesses in Memphis had implemented an average of only 4 out of 17
recommended preparedness activities and those in Des Moines had implemented an average of only
1.7 out of 13 measures (Dahlhamer & D'Souza, 1997).
As is the case for government agencies,
the most consistent variable predicting business emergency preparedness is
organizational size. The Quarantelli, et al. (1979) study of chemical companies
reported larger companies had more extensive planning processes than smaller
ones, a finding replicated in Lindell and Perry’s (1998) study of Los Angeles
hazardous materials handling firms following the 1994 Northridge earthquake.
Increasing size was also associated with evacuation planning in tourist
oriented firms (Drabek, 1991c, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c) and Dahlhamer and D’Souza
(1997) reported a positive correlation between size and preparedness.
As is the case for
households, there does seem to be a positive relationship of disaster
experience with business emergency preparedness (Dahlhamer & Reshaur, 1996;
Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Webb, Tierney & Dahlhamer, 2000). In
addition, other organizational characteristics such as business age, scope
(local vs. national) and type have also been found to correlate with emergency
preparedness, but the findings across studies are inconsistent.
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